



Seminário do Grupo de Álgebra e Geometria

A McEliece Cryptosystem with a Convolutional Mask

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Resumo

Decoding a linear code is in general a difficult task. With the Hamming metric the decoding problem is known to be an NP-hard problem [1], so generic decoding algorithms have a running time which is exponential in the code parameters. In 1978, McEliece designed the first public-key cryptosystem based on coding theory [2]. The public-key is the generator matrix of a code having an efficient decoding algorithm that has being masked to remove any visible structure and the ciphertext is a codeword with some errors added intentionally to hide the message. An attacker only has generic decoding algorithms to recover the message while the legitimate recipient can use the efficient decoding algorithm to recover it. The original proposal uses binary Goppa codes [3] which have an efficient decoding algorithm [4] but a low error-correction capability, which translates into big public-keys, so the cryptosystem has never been used in practice for this reason.

The recent improvements on quantum computing have stress out the necessity of having alternatives to the classical publickey schemes based on integer factorization [5] and discrete logarithms [6], for which attacks based on Shor's algorithm [7] can be performed in a large quantum computer. The McEliece cryptosystem is suitable for this context since there are no known feasible attack based on quantum algorithms, so there is a high interest to find alternatives to the original McEliece cryptosystem with smaller keys. Changing Goppa codes by codes with better error-correction capability such as GRS codes [8] or using a convolutional approach [9] are some of the proposals we can find in the literature. However, they are susceptible to strong structural attacks [10, 11].

By combining both approaches and constructing the cryptosystem adequately to avoid these attacks, we can get public keys which are up to a seventh of the size for the current NIST proposal [12] as it is shown in a recent work [13].

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